SurPRISE re-examines the relationship between security and privacy,
which is commonly positioned as a ‘trade-off’. Where security measures
and technologies involve the collection of information about citizens,
questions arise as to whether and to what extent their privacy has been
infringed. This infringement of individual privacy is sometimes seen as
an acceptable cost of enhanced security. Similarly, it is assumed that
citizens are willing to trade off their privacy for enhanced personal
security in different settings. This common understanding of the
security-privacy relationship, both at state and citizen level, has
informed policymakers, legislative developments and best practice
guidelines concerning security developments across the EU.
However, an emergent body of work questions the validity of the
security-privacy trade-off. This work suggests that it has
over-simplified how the impact of security measures on citizens is
considered in current security policies and practices. Thus, the more
complex issues underlying privacy concerns and public skepticism towards
surveillance-oriented security technologies may not be apparent to
legal and technological experts. In response to these developments, this
project will consult with citizens from several EU member and
associated states on the question of the security-privacy trade-off as
they evaluate different security technologies and measures.
The Twitter logo displayed on a smart phonePhoto: PA
Scientists have developed the ultimate lie detector for social media – a
system that can tell whether a tweeter is telling the truth.
The creators of the system called Pheme, named after the Greek mythological
figure known for scandalous rumour, say it can judge instantly between truth
and fiction in 140 characters or less.
Researchers across Europe are joining forces to analyse the truthfulness of
statements that appear on social media in “real time” and hope their system
will prevent scurrilous rumours and false statements from taking hold, the Times
reported.
The creators believe that the system would have proved useful to the police
and authorities during the London Riots of 2011. Tweeters spread false
reports that animals had been released from London Zoo and landmarks such as
the London Eye and Selfridges had been set on fire, which caused panic and
led to police being diverted.
Kalina Bontcheva, from the University of Sheffield’s engineering department,
said that the system would be able to test information quickly and trace its
origins. This would enable governments, emergency services, health agencies,
journalists and companies to respond to falsehoods.
Lightbeam, a firefox plugin you may want to try... or not... in order to have an idea about what it means for you and your privacy to browse the Web. Nowadays, this is something obvious and well spread that the 'free' Web is now a very old chimera. Web drills you the same way one drills for oil.
Collusion is a similar plugin for the Chrome Web browser.
NSA spying, as
revealed by the whistleblower Edward Snowden, may cause countries to
create separate networks and break up the experts, according to experts.
Photograph: Alex Milan Tracy/NurPhoto/NurPhoto/Corbis
The vast scale of online surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden is leading to the breakup of the internet
as countries scramble to protect private or commercially sensitive
emails and phone records from UK and US security services, according to
experts and academics.
They say moves by countries, such as Brazil and Germany,
to encourage regional online traffic to be routed locally rather than
through the US are likely to be the first steps in a fundamental shift
in the way the internet works. The change could potentially hinder
economic growth.
"States may have few other options than to follow
in Brazil's path," said Ian Brown, from the Oxford Internet Institute.
"This would be expensive, and likely to reduce the rapid rate of
innovation that has driven the development of the internet to date … But
if states cannot trust that their citizens' personal data – as well as
sensitive commercial and government information – will not otherwise be
swept up in giant surveillance operations, this may be a price they are
willing to pay."
Since the Guardian's revelations about the scale
of state surveillance, Brazil's government has published ambitious plans
to promote Brazilian networking technology, encourage regional internet
traffic to be routed locally, and is moving to set up a secure national
email service.
In India, it has been reported that government employees are being advised not to use Gmail
and last month, Indian diplomatic staff in London were told to use
typewriters rather than computers when writing up sensitive documents.
In Germany, privacy commissioners have called for a review of whether Europe's internet traffic can be kept within the EU – and by implication out of the reach of British and US spies.
Surveillance dominated last week's Internet Governance Forum 2013,
held in Bali. The forum is a UN body that brings together more than
1,000 representatives of governments and leading experts from 111
countries to discuss the "sustainability, robustness, security,
stability and development of the internet".
Debates on child
protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed by widespread
concerns from delegates who said the public's trust in the internet was
being undermined by reports of US and British government surveillance.
Lynn
St Amour, the Internet Society's chief executive, condemned government
surveillance as "interfering with the privacy of citizens".
Johan
Hallenborg, Sweden's foreign ministry representative, proposed that
countries introduce a new constitutional framework to protect digital
privacy, human rights and to reinforce the rule of law.
Meanwhile,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers – which is
partly responsible for the infrastructure of the internet – last week
voiced "strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence
of internet users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive
monitoring and surveillance".
Daniel Castro, a senior analyst at
the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation in Washington,
said the Snowden revelations were pushing the internet towards a tipping
point with huge ramifications for the way online communications worked.
"We
are certainly getting pushed towards this cliff and it is a cliff we do
not want to go over because if we go over it, I don't see how we stop.
It is like a run on the bank – the system we have now works unless
everyone decides it doesn't work then the whole thing collapses."
Castro
said that as the scale of the UK and US surveillance operations became
apparent, countries around the globe were considering laws that would
attempt to keep data in-country, threatening the cloud system – where
data stored by US internet firms is accessible from anywhere in the
world.
He said this would have huge implications for the way large companies operated.
"What
this would mean is that any multinational company suddenly has lots of
extra costs. The benefits of cloud computing that have given us
flexibility, scaleability and reduced costs – especially for large
amounts of data – would suddenly disappear."
Large internet-based firms, such as Facebook and Yahoo, have already raised concerns about the impact of the NSA
revelations on their ability to operate around the world. "The
government response was, 'Oh don't worry, we're not spying on any
Americans'," said Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. "Oh, wonderful:
that's really helpful to companies trying to serve people around the
world, and that's really going to inspire confidence in American
internet companies."
Castro wrote a report for Itif in August
predicting as much as $35bn could be lost from the US cloud computing
market by 2016 if foreign clients pull out their businesses. And he said
the full economic impact of the potential breakup of the internet was
only just beginning to be recognised by the global business community.
"This
is changing how companies are thinking about data. It used to be that
the US government was the leader in helping make the world more secure
but the trust in that leadership has certainly taken a hit … This is
hugely problematic for the general trust in the internet and e-commerce
and digital transactions."
Brown said that although a localised
internet would be unlikely to prevent people in one country accessing
information in another area, it may not be as quick and would probably
trigger an automatic message telling the user that they were entering a
section of the internet that was subject to surveillance by US or UK
intelligence.
"They might see warnings when information is about
to be sent to servers vulnerable to the exercise of US legal powers – as
some of the Made in Germany email services that have sprung up over the summer are."
He
said despite the impact on communications and economic development, a
localised internet might be the only way to protect privacy even if, as
some argue, a set of new international privacy laws could be agreed.
"How
could such rules be verified and enforced? Unlike nuclear tests,
internet surveillance cannot be detected halfway around the world."
In the future, most people will live in a total surveillance state – and some of us might even like it
A Banksy graffiti work in London. Photo by Cate Gillon/Getty Images
Suppose you’re walking home one night, alone, and you decide to take a
shortcut through a dark alley. You make it halfway through, when
suddenly you hear some drunks stumbling behind you. Some of them are
shouting curses. They look large and powerful, and there are several of
them. Nonetheless, you feel safe, because you know someone is watching.
You know this because you live in the future where surveillance is
universal, ubiquitous and unavoidable. Governments and large
corporations have spread cameras, microphones and other tracking devices
all across the globe, and they also have the capacity to store and
process oceans of surveillance data in real time. Big Brother not only
watches your sex life, he analyses it. It sounds nightmarish — but it
might be inevitable. So far, attempts to control surveillance have
generally failed. We could be headed straight for the panopticon, and if
recent news developments are any indication, it might not take that
long to get there.
Maybe we should start preparing. And not just by wringing our hands
or mounting attempts to defeat surveillance. For if there’s a chance
that the panopticon is inevitable, we ought to do some hard thinking
about its positive aspects. Cataloguing the downsides of mass
surveillance is important, essential even. But we have a whole
literature devoted to that. Instead, let’s explore its potential
benefits.
The first, and most obvious, advantage of mass surveillance is a
drastic reduction in crime. Indeed, this is the advantage most often put
forward by surveillance proponents today. The evidence as to whether
current surveillance achieves this is ambiguous; cameras, for instance,
seem to have an effect on property crime, but not on incidences of
violence. But today’s world is very different from a panopticon full of
automatically analysed surveillance devices that leave few zones of
darkness.
If calibrated properly, total surveillance might eradicate certain
types of crime almost entirely. People respond well to inevitable
consequences, especially those that follow swiftly on the heels of their
conduct. Few would commit easily monitored crimes such as assault or
breaking and entering, if it meant being handcuffed within minutes. This
kind of ultra-efficient police capability would require not only
sensors capable of recording crimes, but also advanced computer vision
and recognition algorithms capable of detecting crimes quickly. There
has been some recent progress on such algorithms, with further
improvements expected. In theory, they would be able to alert the police
in real time, while the crime was still ongoing. Prompt police
responses would create near-perfect deterrence, and violent crime would
be reduced to a few remaining incidents of overwhelming passion or
extreme irrationality.
If surveillance recordings were stored for later analysis, other
types of crimes could be eradicated as well, because perpetrators would
fear later discovery and punishment. We could expect crimes such as
low-level corruption to vanish, because bribes would become perilous (to
demand or receive) for those who are constantly under watch. We would
likely see a similar reduction in police brutality. There might be an
initial spike in detected cases of police brutality under a total
surveillance regime, as incidents that would previously have gone
unnoticed came to light, but then, after a short while, the numbers
would tumble. Ubiquitous video recording, mobile and otherwise, has
already begun to expose such incidents.
On a smaller scale, mass surveillance would combat all kinds of
abuses that currently go unreported because the abuser has power over
the abused. You see this dynamic in a variety of scenarios, from the
dramatic (child abuse) to the more mundane (line managers insisting on
illegal, unpaid overtime). Even if the victim is too scared to report
the crime, the simple fact that the recordings existed would go a long
way towards equalising existing power differentials. There would be the
constant risk of some auditor or analyst stumbling on the recording, and
once the abused was out of the abuser’s control (grown up, in another
job) they could retaliate and complain, proof in hand. The possibility
of deferred vengeance would make abuse much less likely to occur in the
first place.
With reduced crime, we could also expect a significant reduction in
police work and, by extension, police numbers. Beyond a rapid-reaction
force tasked with responding to rare crimes of passion, there would be
no need to keep a large police force on hand. And there would also be no
need for them to enjoy the special rights they do today. Police
officers can, on mere suspicion, detain you, search your person,
interrogate you, and sometimes enter your home. They can also arrest you
on suspicion of vague ‘crimes’ such as ‘loitering with intent’. Our
present police force is given these powers because it needs to be able
to investigate. Police officers can’t be expected to know who committed
what crime, and when, so they need extra powers to be able to figure
this out, and still more special powers to protect themselves while they
do so. But in a total-surveillance world, there would be no need for
humans to have such extensive powers of investigation. For most crimes,
guilt or innocence would be obvious and easy to establish from the
recordings. The police’s role could be reduced to arresting specific
individuals, who have violated specific laws.
If all goes well, there might be fewer laws for the police to
enforce. Most countries currently have an excess of laws, criminalising
all sorts of behaviour. This is only tolerated because of selective
enforcement; the laws are enforced very rarely, or only against
marginalised groups. But if everyone was suddenly subject to
enforcement, there would have to be a mass legal repeal. When spliffs on
private yachts are punished as severely as spliffs in the ghetto, you
can expect the marijuana legalisation movement to gather steam. When it
becomes glaringly obvious that most people simply can’t follow all the
rules they’re supposed to, these rules will have to be reformed. In the
end, there is a chance that mass surveillance could result in more
personal freedom, not less.
The military is another arm of state power that is ripe for a
surveillance-inspired shrinking. If cross-border surveillance becomes
ubiquitous and effective, we could see a reduction in the $1.7 trillion
that the world spends on the military each year. Previous attempts to
reduce armaments have ultimately been stymied by a lack of reliable
verification. Countries can never trust that their enemies aren’t
cheating, and that encourages them to cheat themselves. Arms races are
also made worse by a psychological phenomenon, whereby each side
interprets the actions of the other as a dangerous provocation, while
interpreting its own as purely defensive or reactive. With cross-border
mass surveillance, countries could check that others are abiding by the
rules, and that they weren’t covertly preparing for an attack. If
intelligence agencies were to use all the new data to become more
sophisticated observers, countries might develop a better understanding
of each other. Not in the hand-holding, peace-and-love sense, but in
knowing what is a genuine threat and what is bluster or posturing. Freed
from fear of surprising new weapons, and surprise attacks, countries
could safely shrink their militaries. And with reduced armies, we should
be able to expect reduced warfare, continuing the historical trend in
conflict reduction since the end of the Second World War.
Of course, these considerations pale when
compared with the potential for mass surveillance to help prevent global
catastrophic risks, and other huge disasters. Pandemics, to name just
one example, are among the deadliest dangers facing the human race. The
Black Death killed a third of Europe’s population in the 14th century
and, in the early 20th century, the Spanish Flu killed off between 50
and 100 million people. In addition, smallpox buried more people than
the two world wars combined. There is no reason to think that great
pandemics are a thing of the past, and in fact there are reasons to
think that another plague could be due soon. There is also the
possibility that a pandemic could arise from synthetic biology, the
human manipulation of microbes to perform specific tasks. Experts are
divided as to the risks involved in this new technology, but they could
be tremendous, especially if someone were to release, accidentally or
malevolently, infectious agents deliberately engineered for high
transmissibility and deadliness.
You can imagine how many lives would have been saved had AIDS been sniffed out by epidemiologists more swiftly
Mass surveillance could help greatly here, by catching lethal
pandemics in their earliest stages, or beforehand, if we were to see one
being created artificially. It could also expose lax safety standards
or dangerous practices in legitimate organisations. Surveillance could
allow for quicker quarantines, and more effective treatment of
pandemics. Medicines and doctors could be rushed to exactly the right
places, and micro-quarantines could be instituted. More dramatic
measures, such as airport closures, are hard to implement on a large
scale, but these quick-response tactics could be implemented narrowly
and selectively. Most importantly, those infected could be rapidly
informed of their condition, allowing them to seek prompt treatment.
With proper procedures and perfect surveillance, we could avoid
pandemics altogether. Infections would be quickly isolated and
eliminated, and eradication campaigns would be shockingly efficient.
Tracking the movements and actions of those who fell ill would make it
much easier to research the causes and pathology of diseases. You can
imagine how many lives would have been saved had AIDS been sniffed out
by epidemiologists more swiftly.
Likewise, mass surveillance could prevent the terrorist use of nukes,
dirty bombs, or other futuristic weapons. Instead of blanket bans in
dangerous research areas, we could allow research to proceed and use
surveillance to catch bad actors and bad practices. We might even see an
increase in academic freedom.
Surveillance could also be useful in smaller, more conventional
disasters. Knowing where everyone in a city was at the moment an
earthquake struck would make rescue services much more effective, and
the more cameras around when hurricanes hit, the better. Over time, all
of this footage would increase our understanding of disasters, and help
us to mitigate their effects.
Indeed, there are whole new bodies of research that could emerge from
the data provided by mass surveillance. Instead of formulating theories
and laboriously recruiting a biased and sometimes unwilling group for
testing, social scientists, economists and epidemiologists could use
surveillance data to test their ideas. And they could do it from home,
immediately, and have access to the world’s entire population. Many
theories could be rapidly confirmed or discarded, with great benefit to
society. The panopticon would be a research nirvana.
Lying and hypocrisy would become practically impossible, and one could no longer project a false image of oneself
Mass surveillance could also make our lives more convenient, by
eliminating the need for passwords. The surveillance system itself could
be used for identification, provided the algorithms were sufficiently
effective. Instead of Mr John Smith typing in ‘passw0rd!!!’ to access
his computer or ‘2345’ to access his money, the system could simply
track where he was at all times, and grant him access to any computers
and money he had the right to. Long security lines at airports could
also be eliminated. If surveillance can detect prohibited items, then
searches are a waste of time. Effective crime detection and deterrence
would mean that people would have little reason to lock their cars or
their doors.
Doing business in a mass surveillance society would be smoother, too.
Outdoor festivals and concerts would no longer need high fences,
security patrols, and intimidating warnings. They could simply replace
them with clear signs along the boundary of the event, as anyone
attending would be identified and billed directly. People could dash
into a shop, grab what they needed, and run out, without having to wait
in line or check out. The camera system would have already billed them.
Drivers who crashed into parked cars would no longer need to leave a
note. They’d be tracked anyway, and insurance companies would have
already settled the matter by the time they returned home. Everyday
human interactions would be changed in far-reaching ways. Lying and
hypocrisy would become practically impossible, and one could no longer
project a false image of oneself. In the realm of personal identity,
there would be less place for imagination or reinvention, and more place
for honesty.
Today’s intricate copyright laws could be simplified, and there would
be no need for the infantilising mess of reduced functionality that is
‘Digital Rights Management’. Surveillance would render DRM completely
unnecessary, meaning that anyone who purchased a song could play it
anytime, on any machine, while copying it and reusing it to their
heart’s content. There would be no point in restricting these uses,
because the behaviour that copyrights holders object to — passing the
music on to others — would be detected and tagged separately. Every time
you bought a song, a book, or even a movie, you’d do so knowing that it
would be with you wherever you went for the rest of your life.
The virtues and vices of surveillance are the imagined virtues and
vices of small villages, which tend to be safe and neighbourly, but
prejudiced and judgemental. With the whole world as the village, we can
hope that the multiplicity of cultures and lifestyles would reduce a
global surveillance culture’s built-in potential for prejudice and
judgment. With people more trusting, and less fearful, of each other, we
could become more willing to help out, more willing to take part in
common projects, more pro-social and more considerate. Yes, these
potential benefits aren’t the whole story on mass surveillance, and I
would never argue that they outweigh the potential downsides. But if
we’re headed into a future panopticon, we’d better brush up on the
possible upsides. Because governments might not bestow these benefits
willingly — we will have to make sure to demand them.
En 1970 donc, Newsweek expliquait que "durant les vingt dernières années, les Etats-Unis sont devenus (…)
l'un des pays qui espionnent le plus et sont le plus soucieux de ses
données dans l'histoire mondiale. Les gros commerçants, les petits
commerçants, l'administration fiscale, les institutions de police, les
organismes de recensement, les sociologues, les banques, les écoles, les
centres médicaux, les patrons, les agences fédérales, les compagnies
d'assurance (…), tous cherchent obstinément, stockent et
utilisent chaque parcelle d'information qu'ils peuvent trouver sur
chacun des 205 millions d'Américains, individus et groupes". Bref, "très
bientôt, toute la vie et l'histoire d'une personne va être disponible
en un clic sur un ordinateur. On va finir en 1984 avant d'avoir atteint
cette année", prévoyait, à cette époque, un juriste américain.
L'article énumère une série d'anecdotes où s'entrechoquent collectes
de données pour la sécurité et protection de la vie privée. Par exemple,
cette bibliothécaire qui a reçu une visite d'employés de l'IRS,
l'agence américaine chargée des impôts, lui demandant de lui fournir les
noms des "utilisateurs de matériel militant et subversif" – ouvrage sur les explosifs ou biographie du Che Guevara. Ou ce fichier de l'armée fichant les "potentiels perturbateurs ostensibles de la paix", "en plus des 7 millions de fichiers de routine" sur la loyauté ou le statut criminel des citoyens.
Le chapitre sur les écoutes téléphoniques est tout aussi parlant : les écoutes légales, "prudemment
utilisées pendant la seconde guerre mondiale pour pister les espions et
les saboteurs, sont devenues une pratique si banale du FBI et de la
police à la fin des années 1950 qu'elles étaient menées, dit-on, contre
chaque bookmaker du coin". A la suite de l'indignation de certains politiques,
"le Congrès a spécifié en 1968 que le département de justice, le FBI et
la police ne pouvaient pratiquer la surveillance électronique qu'avec
un ordre de justice". Mais le gouvernement fédéral se réserve
toujours le droit de faire des écoutes clandestines, sans ordre de
justice, dans l'intérêt de la "sécurité nationale", explique Newsweek. Avant de préciser – de manière un peu incongrue, vu d'aujourd'hui : "La méfiance grandissante envers le téléphone représente la seule protection réelle de la vie privée."
En parallèle de ce vaste mouvement de collecte des données, les
Américains sont devenus de plus en plus sensibles à leur droit à la
protection de leur vie privée, explique l'hebdomadaire. Ce qui n'empêche
pas, aujourd'hui, une majorité d'entre eux d'approuver la surveillance
des communications téléphoniques, et 62 % d'estimer qu'il est important
que le gouvernement fédéral enquête sur d'éventuelles menaces
"terroristes", quitte à empiéter sur la vie privée, selon un sondage publié le 10 juin.
Fed up with the NSA’s infringement of privacy, an internet user by the name of Sang Mun has developed a font which cannot be read by computers.
Called ‘ZXX’, which is used by the Library of Congress to
state that a document has “no linguistic content”, the font is garbled
up in such a way that computers with Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
will not be able to recognize it.
Available in four “disguises”, this font uses camouflage
techniques to trick the computers of governments and corporations into
thinking that no useful information can be collated from people, while
remaining readable to the human eye.
The font developer urges users to fight against this infringement of privacy, and has made this font free for all users on his website.
NEC is working on a suitcase-sized DNA analyzer, which it says will
be able to process samples at the scene of a crime or disaster in as
little as 25 minutes.
The company said it aims to launch the device globally in 2014, and
sell it for around 10 million yen, or US$120,000. It will output samples
that can be quickly matched via the growing number of DNA databases
worldwide.
“At first we will target investigative organizations, like police,”
said spokeswoman Marita Takahashi. “We will also push its use on victims
of natural disasters, to quickly match samples from siblings and
parents.”
NEC hopes to use research and software from its mature fingerprint
and facial matching technology, which have been deployed in everyday
devices such as smartphones and ATMs.
NEC
is working on a suitcase-sized DNA sampler that it says will weigh 35
kilograms and be able to process samples in about 25 minutes.
The company said that the need for cheaper and faster DNA testing
became clear in the aftermath of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that
devasted much of Japan’s northeast coastline last year, when authorities
performed nearly 20,000 samples.
NEC pointed to growing databases such as CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) in the U.S. and a Japanese database of DNA samples.
The company said it is aiming to make the device usable for those
with minimal training, requiring only a cotton swab or small blood
sample. NEC aims to make a device that weighs around 35 kilograms,
measuring 850 millimeters by 552mm by 240mm, about the size of a large
suitcase. The unit will run on a 12V power source.
NEC said it will be able to complete three-stage analysis process
using a “lab on a chip” process, a term for for technology that
recreates lab processes on chip-sized components. The basic steps for
analysis include extracting DNA from samples, amplifying the DNA for
analysis, and then separating out the different DNA strands.
The current version of the analyzer takes about an hour for all three tasks, and NEC said it aims to lower that to 25 minutes.
NEC it is carrying out the development of the analyzer together with
partners including Promega, a U.S. biotechnology firm, and is testing it
with a police science research institute in Japan.
Governments around the world made nearly 21,000 requests for access to Google data in the first six months of this year, according to the search engine.
Its Transparency Reportindicates government surveillance of online lives is rising sharply.
The US government made the most demands, asking for details 7,969 times in the first six months of 2012.
Turkey topped the list for requests to remove content.
Government 'bellwether'
Google, in common with other technology and communication companies, regularly receives requests from government agencies and courts around the world to have access to content.
It has been publishing its Transparency Report twice a year since 2009 and has seen a steady rise in government demands for data. In its first report in 2009, it received 12,539 requests. The latest figure stands at 20,939.
"This is the sixth time we've released this
data, and one trend has become clear: government surveillance is on the
rise," Google said in a blog post.
The report acts as a bellwether for government behaviour around the world, a Google spokeswoman told the BBC.
"It reflects laws on the ground. For example in Turkey there
are specific laws about defaming public figures whereas in Germany we
get requests to remove neo-Nazi content," she said.
"And in Brazil we get a lot of requests to remove content
during elections because there is a law banning parodies of candidates.
"We hope that the report will shed light on how governments interact
with online services and how laws are reflected in online behaviour,"
she added.
The US has consistently topped the charts for data requests. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK are also in the top 10.
In France and Germany it complied with fewer than half of all
requests. In the UK it complied with 64% of requests and 90% of
requests from the US.
Removing content
Google said the top three reasons cited by government for content removal were defamation, privacy and security.
Worldwide authorities made 1,789 requests for Google to remove content, up from 1,048 requests for the last six months of 2011.
In the period from January to June, Turkey made 501 requests for content removal.
These included 148 requests related to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk -
the first president of Turkey, the current government, national
identity and values.
Others included claims of pornography, hate speech and copyright.
Google has its own criteria for whether it will remove
content - the request must be specific, relate to a specific web address
and have come from a relevant authority.
In one example from the UK, Google received a request from
police to remove 14 search results that linked to sites allegedly
criticising the police and claiming individuals were involved in
obscuring crimes. It did not remove the content.
Inter-individual variation in facial shape is one of the most noticeable
phenotypes in humans, and it is clearly under genetic regulation;
however, almost nothing is known about the genetic basis of normal human
facial morphology. We therefore conducted a genome-wide association
study for facial shape phenotypes in multiple discovery and replication
cohorts, considering almost ten thousand individuals of European descent
from several countries. Phenotyping of facial shape features was based
on landmark data obtained from three-dimensional head magnetic resonance
images (MRIs) and two-dimensional portrait images. We identified five
independent genetic loci associated with different facial phenotypes,
suggesting the involvement of five candidate genes—PRDM16, PAX3, TP63, C5orf50, and COL17A1—in
the determination of the human face. Three of them have been implicated
previously in vertebrate craniofacial development and disease, and the
remaining two genes potentially represent novel players in the molecular
networks governing facial development. Our finding at PAX3
influencing the position of the nasion replicates a recent GWAS of
facial features. In addition to the reported GWA findings, we
established links between common DNA variants previously associated with
NSCL/P at 2p21, 8q24, 13q31, and 17q22 and normal facial-shape
variations based on a candidate gene approach. Overall our study implies
that DNA variants in genes essential for craniofacial development
contribute with relatively small effect size to the spectrum of normal
variation in human facial morphology. This observation has important
consequences for future studies aiming to identify more genes involved
in the human facial morphology, as well as for potential applications of
DNA prediction of facial shape such as in future forensic applications.
Introduction
The morphogenesis and
patterning of the face is one of the most complex events in mammalian
embryogenesis. Signaling cascades initiated from both facial and
neighboring tissues mediate transcriptional networks that act to direct
fundamental cellular processes such as migration, proliferation,
differentiation and controlled cell death. The complexity of human
facial development is reflected in the high incidence of congenital
craniofacial anomalies, and almost certainly underlies the vast spectrum
of subtle variation that characterizes facial appearance in the human
population.
Facial appearance has
a strong genetic component; monozygotic (MZ) twins look more similar
than dizygotic (DZ) twins or unrelated individuals. The heritability of
craniofacial morphology is as high as 0.8 in twins and families [1], [2], [3]. Some craniofacial traits, such as facial height and position of the lower jaw, appear to be more heritable than others [1], [2], [3].
The general morphology of craniofacial bones is largely genetically
determined and partly attributable to environmental factors [4]–[11]. Although genes have been mapped for various rare craniofacial syndromes largely inherited in Mendelian form [12],
the genetic basis of normal variation in human facial shape is still
poorly understood. An appreciation of the genetic basis of facial shape
variation has far reaching implications for understanding the etiology
of facial pathologies, the origin of major sensory organ systems, and
even the evolution of vertebrates [13], [14].
In addition, it is feasible to speculate that once the majority of
genetic determinants of facial morphology are understood, predicting
facial appearance from DNA found at a crime scene will become useful as
investigative tool in forensic case work [15]. Some externally visible human characteristics, such as eye color [16]–[18] and hair color [19], can already be inferred from a DNA sample with practically useful accuracies.
In a recent candidate
gene study carried out in two independent European population samples,
we investigated a potential association between risk alleles for
non-syndromic cleft lip with or without cleft palate (NSCL/P) and nose
width and facial width in the normal population [20].
Two NSCL/P associated single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) showed
association with different facial phenotypes in different populations.
However, facial landmarks derived from 3-Dimensional (3D) magnetic
resonance images (MRI) in one population and 2-Dimensional (2D) portrait
images in the other population were not completely comparable, posing a
challenge for combining phenotype data. In the present study, we focus
on the MRI-based approach for capturing facial morphology since previous
facial imaging studies by some of us have demonstrated that MRI-derived
soft tissue landmarks represent a reliable data source [21], [22].
In geometric
morphometrics, there are different ways to deal with the confounders of
position and orientation of the landmark configurations, such as (1)
superimposition [23], [24] that places the landmarks into a consensus reference frame; (2) deformation [25]–[27], where shape differences are described in terms of deformation fields of one object onto another; and (3) linear distances [28], [29],
where Euclidean distances between landmarks instead of their
coordinates are measured. Rationality and efficacy of these approaches
have been reviewed and compared elsewhere [30]–[32].
We briefly compared these methods in the context of our genome-wide
association study (GWAS) (see Methods section) and applied them when
appropriate.
We extracted facial
landmarks from 3D head MRI in 5,388 individuals of European origin from
Netherlands, Australia, and Germany, and used partial Procrustes
superimposition (PS) [24], [30], [33]
to superimpose different sets of facial landmarks onto a consensus 3D
Euclidean space. We derived 48 facial shape features from the
superimposed landmarks and estimated their heritability in 79 MZ and 90
DZ Australian twin pairs. Subsequently, we conducted a series of GWAS
separately for these facial shape dimensions, and attempted to replicate
the identified associations in 568 Canadians of European (French)
ancestry with similar 3D head MRI phenotypes and additionally sought
supporting evidence in further 1,530 individuals from the UK and 2,337
from Australia for whom facial phenotypes were derived from 2D portrait
images.